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Land Use Controls
ROBERT

M.

RHODES* AND MITCHELL B. HAIGLER**

The authorsexamine recent decisions in land use law during
the survey period. The areas considered include: inverse condemnation; lake ownership under the Marketable Record Title Act;
developments of regionalimpact; standing requirements to challenge land use; the continued vitality of the fairly debatablerule;
and other developments dealing with zoning.
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ZONING

Standing Requirements

In Dugan v. City of Jacksonville,I a property owner ultimately
was granted relief from a zoning ordinance which he claimed was
unreasonable, discriminatory, arbitrary and unconstitutional.2 The

District Court of Appeal, First District, found that uncontradicted
evidence showed that the appellant's property was no longer reasonably suitable for single-family residential purposes and was not even
suitable for multi-family usage.' In addition, it was not "fairly debatable" that the subject zoning classification promoted public
health, safety, morals or general welfare.4 The court, therefore, held
the zoning ordinance unconstitutional in its application and remanded the case with instructions to enjoin the imposition of any
zoning classification more restrictive than commercial.
Of particular interest in this case is an issue the First District
B.A., 1964; J.D., 1968 University of California at Berkeley; M.P.A., Harvard University, 1973. Member of the Florida Bar and the law firm of Thompson, Wadsworth, Messer,
Turner & Rhodes, Tallahassee, Florida.
** B.A., University of Alabama, 1968; J.D., Florida State University, 1975. Member of
the Florida Bar and the law firm of Thompson, Wadsworth, Messer, Turner & Rhodes,
Tallahassee, Florida.
1. 343 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
2. Id. at 104.
3. Id. at 105.
4. Id.
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felt "constrained to comment upon." 5 Appellee city contended it
was necessary for the property owner to show peculiar injury to
himself resulting from the surrounding uses authorized by the existing zoning, that is, injury different from that suffered by other
neighboring property owners. The city argued that such peculiar
damage was a requirement of standing to challenge the existing
zoning. The First District rejected the city's argument on the basis
that the relief sought was not from a violation of an ordinance by
another party, but from the imposition of an existing zoning classification upon the property owner. The court concluded that the
plaintiff-appellant need only be adversely affected by the existing
zoning classification in order to maintain standing to challenge. The
court specifically determined that "[t]he fact that other neighboring property owners are also adversely affected by the same conditions which adversely affect a complaining property owner will not
defeat the latter's right to relief if the evidence reveals invalidity of
the ordinance in general or in its application to him." 6
Standing requirements for challenging land use decisions provide a fertile area for legal imagination. The Supreme Court of
Florida attempted to unravel the disparate common law requirements in Renard v. Dade County' by establishing three categories
of challenges based on the nature of the governmental action at
issue.
The first Renard category involves a challenge to zoning ordinances alleged to have been improperly enacted contrary to applicable procedural rules. With respect to standing to attack an improperly enacted ordinance, the court simply stated: "Any affected
resident, citizen or property owner of the governmental unit in question has standing to challenge such an ordinance." 8 The court did
not define the term "affected," implicitly acknowledging the susceptibility of such ordinances to procedural challenges.,
A second standing criterion offered by the court in Renard applies to validly enacted ordinances. To attack the substantive validity of an ordinance, such as a change in land use classification" or
5. Id.at 106.
6. Id.
7. 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1972).
8. Id. at 838.
9. See Upper Keys Citizens' Ass'n v. Wedel, 341 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977). Standing, however, is conferred "only for the above limited purpose of testing the validity of the
enactment itself." Id. at 1064 (emphasis added).
10. The "adversely affected" standing requirement applies to those challenging a zoning
decision that changes land use classifications. The challenged change may be effectuated by
a rezoning ordinance or resolution, Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956), or by a
variance granting a nonconforming use, Friedland v. City of Hollywood, 130 So. 2d 306 (Fla.
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the imposition of an existing classification, a party must show that
he is aggrieved or adversely affected, the two standards being synonymous." The court defined an aggrieved or adversely affected party
as one
who has a legally recognizable interest which is or will be affected
by the action of the zoning authority in question. The interest
may be one shared in common with a number of other members
of the community as where an entire neighborhood is affected,
but not every resident and property owner of a municipality can,
as a general rule, claim such an interest. An individual having
standing must have a definite interest exceeding the general interest2 in community good share [sic] in common with all citizens.

To be adversely affected according to the Renard test, a person
in the posture of the Dugan plaintiff must show an interest exceeding in degree, although not necessarily in kind, that of the general
community. In determining the sufficiency of interest, the court in
Renard suggested that courts consider:
the proximity of his property to the property to be zoned or rezoned, the character of the neighborhood, including the existence
of common restrictive covenants and setback requirements, and
the type of change proposed .

. .

. The fact that a person is

among those entitled to receive notice under the zoning ordinance
is a factor to be considered on the question of standing to challenge the proposed zoning action.'"
The third Renard criterion involves alleged violations of a zoning ordinance, such as administrative action relating to special exceptions and variances. In such cases, a complainant "must allege
and prove special damages peculiar to himself differing in kind as
distinguished from damages differing in degree suffered by the community as a whole.""
2d Dist. 1961); Elwyn v. City of Miami, 113 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959). Prior to Renard,
two district courts of appeal had applied the "special injury" rule to challenges to a rezoning
decision. Florida Palm-Aire Corp. v. Delvin, 230 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 234 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1970)(per curiam); Janko v. City of Hialeah, 212 So. 2d 800
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
11. The terms "aggrieved" and "adversely affected" were equated since the court could
find no reason for a distinction in standing requirements based on whether the case originated
in the court system or as an appeal to a zoning board, where such boards exist. 261 So. 2d at
837. In addition, standing criteria are the same for declaratory judgments or injunctions as
for a request of certiorari regarding a zoning appeals board determination. Id. at n.12.
12. Id. at 837.
13. Id.
14. Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So. 2d 132, 135 (Fla. 1958). In Boucher, plaintiffs alleged
that the zoning violation would depreciate their own land value and the land values of other
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Special injury appears to be assessed by the courts based on the
proximity of the plaintiff's property to the defendant's property. In
Boucher v. Novotny," plaintiff's home was across the street from
and facing defendant's property. Such proximity was deemed insufficient to show special injury.' 6 Where lands were adjoining, however, plaintiff has been able to prove a special injury. 7
Although the courts since Renard have consistently granted
standing to adjoining homeowners under the special injury rule,
neighboring businesses have not been able successfully to assert loss
of business as special injury.'" Moreover, an allegation that a variance deprives a business of the opportunity to obtain federally sponsored flood insurance was deemed insufficient to show special injury.'
Notwithstanding Renard, the County and Municipal Planning
for Future Development Act 0 provides a less stringent standard for
challenges to administrative action. This legislation authorizes local
governments to create boards of adjustment empowered to hear
challenges to decisions made by administrative officials relating to
special exceptions and variances.' Appeals to a board of adjustment
may be taken by "any person aggrieved . . . by any decision of an
administrative official under any zoning ordinance." 2 Any person
property owners. They therefore failed to show an injury different in kind from the community. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' cause of action
because "the complaint failed to present factual allegations that would sustain the granting
of the relief requested." Id. at 137. Of interest is the fact that in Renard the supreme court
reconsidered its decision in Boucher:
The Boucher rule requiring special damages still covers this type of suit.
However, in the twenty years since the Boucher decision, changed conditions,
including increased population growth and density, require a more lenient application of that rule. The facts of the Boucher case, if presented today, would
probably be sufficient to show special damages.
261 So. 2d at 837-38.
15. 102 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1958).
16. But in a case where the plaintiff homeowner lived across a waterway from the defendant's property the court held that there was a special injury because defendant's action
"would build a 'chinese wall' across the waterway from the [plaintiff's] property, thereby,
obstructing their view and possibly causing delay in recession of storm waters which could
aggravate the risk of flooding the home of the plaintiff." State v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 306 So.
2d 616, 618 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
17. Carroll v. City of West Palm Beach, 276 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
18. Skaggs-Albertson's Properties, Inc. v. Michels Belleair Bluffs Pharmacy, Inc., 332
So. 2d 113, 116 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); cf. S.A. Lynch Inv. Corp. v. City of Miami, 151 So. 2d
858 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert denied, 155 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1963) (allegation of loss of desirability
and value of plaintiff's facilities insufficient to prove special damages).
19. Jack Eckerd Corp. v. Michels Island Village Pharmacy, Inc. 322 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1975).
20. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.160-.3211 (1977).
21. Id. §§ 163.220, .225.
22. Id. § 163.235.
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aggrieved by a decision of the board of adjustment may then appeal
to the appropriate circuit court for judicial relief by trial de novo or
by petition for writ of certiorari. 3 Hence, in contrast to case law
which requires special injury as a condition to challenging invalid
administrative implementation of an ordinance, the County and
Municipal Planning for Future Development Act merely requires
that the challenger be aggrieved.
The Renard rules should come under renewed scrutiny with the
implementation of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning
Act of 1975 (LGCPA). 4 By July 1, 1979, every county and municipality must adopt a comprehensive land use plan."5 Of particular
significance is the legislative mandate that following the adoption
of a comprehensive plan, "all developments undertaken by, and all
actions taken in regard to development orders by, governmental
agencies in regard to land covered by" the plan must be consistent
with the plan. 8 Any land development regulations must also be
consistent with the adopted comprehensive plan." In addition, the
legislature enacted a statement of intent that "adopted comprehensive plans or elements thereof shall be implemented, in part, by the
adoption and enforcement of appropriate local regulations on the
development of lands and waters within an area. '"28
Standing requirements for challenging local land use decisions
are not provided in the LGCPA. However, legislative establishment
of a firm legal basis for the land use plan will prompt reconsideration and perhaps reinterpretation of the Renard rules. In accordance
with Renard, a challenge to a rezoning decision, for example, could
be initiated by an adversely affected person. With the implementation of the LGCPA, a number of localities will include authorized
land use and density criteria in their plans." As a result, the basic
legislative decision regarding land use traditionally reflected in the
zoning ordinance will be incorporated in the land use plan and an
adversely affected person, following Renard guidelines, could challenge the substantive land use decisions included in such a plan.
Once the land use plan is adopted, all implementing action
must be consistent with the plan, including zoning and subdivision
regulations. If such regulatory implementation measures must con23. Id. § 163.250.
24. Id. 99 163.3161-.3211.
25. Id. §§ 163.3167(2), .3177(6)(a).
26. Id. § 163.3194(1).
27. Land development regulations include "zoning, subdivision, building and construction or other regulations controlling the development of land." Id. § 163.3194(2)(b).
28. Id. § 163.3201.
29. Id. § 163.3177(6)(a).
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form with the plan, it is arguable that these measures are merely
administrative. Renard requires a showing of a special injury in a
challenge to such administrative action. Following this reasoning,
a plaintiff alleging that a rezoning is inconsistent with an adopted
land use plan would have to show special injury. On the other hand,
a complainant might argue that failure of the local government to
properly amend the land use plan, as a condition precedent to granting a rezoning, constitutes noncompliance with the procedural requirements of the LGCPA. Under this argument, any affected resident, citizen or taxpayer would have standing to bring such a challenge. A plaintiff's standing to challenge a land use plan may, therefore, depend upon how he frames his complaint.
It is apparent from this brief discussion that the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 is likely to stimulate
renewed interest in standing requirements for land use challenges.
Under the LGCPA, the land use plan is binding and regulatory
measures are simply implementing measures. This significant modification of the renewable planning-regulatory relationship may
demand a concomitant modification of traditional rules of standing
to challenge land use decisions.
B.

The Fairly Debatable Rule

In Dade County v. Yum bo, '"the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, stated the appropriate evidentiary standard to be applied
in judicial review of a zoning body's administrative actions. In reviewing the Dade County Board of County Commissioners' refusal
to grant a rezoning, the trial court had applied the substantial competent evidence standard. The appellate court reversed, holding
that in "cases involving Dade County zoning actions, which are
universally considered administrative in nature, the trial court shall
employ the fairly debatable rule." 3 '
Appellee-Yumbo, the owner of a 400 acre tract located in unincorporated Dade County between a military air base and a bay,
petitioned the County Commission for a rezoning of its property to
permit residential and business uses. Rezoning would have necessitated a change of district boundaries. The natural aspects of the
tract, however, would have been preserved by putting the housing
units on stilts.2
Relying on recommendations of the county planning depart30. 348 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
31. Id. at 394.
32. Id. at 393.
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ment, the commissioners denied the application for rezoning. Reasons for the denial included: direct conflict between the proposed
uses and the master development plan, overflights of the land stemming from its proximity to the air base and insufficient public facili33
ties to support the proposed development.
Granting Yumbo's petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court
found that the refusal of rezoning was not supported by substantial
competent evidence.3 4 The court's application of that evidentiary
standard was a departure from the commonly applied and long
recognized fairly debatable doctrine.
The fairly debatable rule requires that a zoning regulation be
upheld if there exists a fairly debatable substantial relationship to
the public welfare. 3 First formulated in the landmark decision of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 31 the doctrine places on the
challenger the onerous burden of showing that the challenged regulation is not fairly debatable. Minimally, the dispute as to the ordinance must be "on grounds that make sense. '37 A fairly debatable
regulation is one based on reason or logical deduction. The substantial competent evidence rule, on the other hand, places a greater
burden on the zoning body to justify its action.
The trial court in Yumbo held that the fairly debatable rule had
been abrogated by recent cases, notably Baker v. Metropolitan
Dade County. 38 The theory behind the trial court's decision was that
zoning actions previously considered administrative in nature had
been recharacterized by the courts as quasi-judicial, thereby compelling use of the substantial competent evidence standard. In
Baker, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, had held that
the zoning authority's use of a resolution as a means for denying a
request for rezoning was quasi-judicial in nature. 39
In Yumbo, the Third District explained that cases such as
Baker had not dealt with the evidentiary standard applicable to
review of zoning actions but rather with the procedure or method
utilized to seek judicial review." Until 1966, the appropriate method
of judicial review of zoning actions was determined by reference to
whether the action was administrative or quasi-judicial in nature.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
36. Id.
37. City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1953).
38. 237 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
39. Id. at 202. See also Dade County v. Marca, 326 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1976); Centex Homes
Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 318 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
40. 348 So. 2d at 393.
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Zoning actions that were administrative in nature were subject to
direct attack by equitable proceedings; on the other hand, quasijudicial orders were reviewable by certiorari.4 Then, in Dade
County v. Metro Improvement Corp.,"2 the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that the sole method of review of a zoning
decision of the Dade County Board of County Commissioners was
by certiorari.
Requests for rezoning traditionally have been considered as
administrative actions. In Baker, however the Third District, while
discussing the proper method of review of a request for rezoning,
stated that the Commission's utilization of a resolution as a means
of denying a request for rezoning was -quasi-judicial in nature. 3
Hence, it appeared from Baker that zoning matters previously considered administrative in nature had been recategorized as quasijudicial.
Recognizing this as a logical interpretation of Baker, the court
explained that it had not abandoned the fairly debatable rule." The
Third District cited language in Baker 5 and cases decided subse5 which indicated that the fairly debatable rule had
quent to Baker"
not been abandoned in Dade County zoning actions.
The Third District also found error in the trial court's determination that a navigational easement and a taking had resulted
from the rezoning. 7 The court found unquestionable "the incompatibility of residential development in close proximity to an airport." 8
The decision, however, did not foreclose the appellee from obtaining
relief by way of inverse condemnation. 9
The court found it unnecessary to rule upon the validity of the
master zoning plan as it affected appellee's property." The court did
indicate that to be successful an owner would have to show that his
property could not be put to a "reasonable use compatible with the
master plan."'"
41. Id. at 393-94.
42. 190 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
43. 237 So. 2d at 202.
44. 348 So. 2d at 394.
45. "The latter zoning is, at the very least, fairly debatable, and as such should be
sustained." 237 So. 2d at 202.
46. See, e.g., Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1972); Marca v. Dade County,
332 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976); Metropolitan Dade County v. Fletcher, 311 So. 2d 738
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
47. 348 So. 2d at 394.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 395.
50. Id.

51. Id.
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C. Zoning Objectives
Moviematic Industries Corp. v. Board of

County

Commissioners52 concerned the validity of a rezoning resolution for

the protection of the affected area's fresh water system and natural
ecological systems. The two fold challenge asserted that the resolution did not bear a reasonable relationship to the public health,
safety, morals and welfare, and constituted an impermissible taking
of real property.
Appellee had imposed a building moratorium in an unincorporated area of Dade County to allow a comprehensive study directed
to the protection of the natural ecological systems and fresh water
supply in the affected area. Following the study and a public hearing, appellee adopted a resolution that terminated appellant's previously granted special permit for business airport uses and rezoned
its property from heavy industrial use to single family residence.
The trial court denied appellant's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Affirming the trial court's decision, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, first considered whether preservation of adequate drinking water supplies and natural ecological systems are
valid zoning objectives." The court recognized the established rule
that zoning regulations reasonably related to the preservation of
essential governmental services, such as water supply, are valid.'
More notable was the court's recognition that the preservation
of existing ecological systems is a valid zoning objective. 5 Zoning
regulations that tend to preserve the residential or historical character of a neighborhood have long been recognized as valid.56 Zoning
measures designed to enhance the aesthetic appeal of a community
have also been recognized as valid exercises of the police power. 7 If
these are legitimate zoning objectives, the court concluded, "then
certainly the irreversible effect on the area's ecological balance as
the result of urban development can be and should be considered
and reflected in zoning codes."58
The court announced that recognition of ecological considerations as legitimate concerns of zoning regulations was long overdue
52. 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
53. Id. at 669.

54. See R. ANDERSON,

AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING

§ 7.26 (2d ed. 1968).

55. 349 So. 2d at 669.
56. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975); Sunad, Inc.
v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960).
57. See, e.g., Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean
& Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941); City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d 201

(Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
58. 349 So. 2d at 669.
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in Florida." Noting that other jurisdictions had accepted ecological
objectives as appropriate zoning considerations, the court quoted
extensively from a New York decision, Nattin Realty, Inc. v.
Ludewig.1°
Respecting ecology as a new factor, it appears that the time has
come-if, indeed, it has not already irretrievably passed-for the
courts . . . to take "ecological notice" in zoning matters.
The court is not unmindful that zoning changes prompted by
such environmental considerations may appreciably limit the
uses and profitability of land; yet if both factors were to be placed
upon the scales, the pro bono publico considerations must prevail. If there is substantial evidence sustaining the muncipality's
determination to rezone because of ecology, the court should not
void such legislative determination.
The court then reviewed the evidence presented to the commission
and concluded that it substantiated the county's position that the
resolution was reasonably related to the public health and welfare
and would confer a public benefit.'
The court further held that appellant had not shown the resolution to be an unlawful taking of property. Appellant had failed to
present sufficient evidence demonstrating its property could not be
put to any reasonable use compatible with the rezoning. At best, the
appellant had shown that the rezoning had resulted in a reduction
of the property's market value. Noting that the appellant had
owned the property for over ten years without taking concrete steps
toward developing it, the court left open the possibility that compensation would be possible if appellant, after taking positive steps
to develop its property, became deprived of the beneficial use of the
property. 2
D.

Discriminatory Zoning Effects

In Village of Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development Corp."3 the Supreme Court of the United States established a
standard for determining whether a municipality's decision to deny
a rezoning request is unconstitutionally discriminatory. In order to
build racially integrated low and moderate income housing, Metro59. Id.
60. 67 Misc. 2d 828, 324 N.Y.S.2d 668, 672 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
61. 349 So. 2d at 670.
62. Id. at 671.
63. 429 U.S. 252 (1977), rev'g 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'g 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D.
I1. 1974).
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politan Housing Development Corporation "(MHDC) contracted to
purchase a tract within the boundaries of petitioner-village. The
purchase was contingent upon securing rezoning and federal housing assistance. Accordingly, MHDC applied to the village for the
rezoning from single family to multiple family (R-5) classification.
Although the fact that the project probably would be racially integrated was discussed, opponents of the rezoning stressed two arguments: first, the area had always been zoned single family and the
village citizens had purchased in reliance thereof; and second, the
village apartment policy only permitted R-5 zoning to serve as a
buffer between single family and commercial or manufacturing districts, none of which bordered the proposed location. The village
denied rezoning.
MHDC and three black individuals sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.11 The
district court held that the village rezoning denial was motivated by
a "legitimate desire to protect property values and the integrity of
the village's zoning plan." 5
Although approving the district court's finding that the village
was not motivated by racial discrimination, a divided Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the "ultimate
effect" of the village's decision was racially discriminatory in that
it would disproportionately affect blacks. 6
The Supreme Court reversed and held that MHDC had standing to bring the action but failed to carry the burden of proving that
racially discriminatory intent or purpose was a motivating factor in
the rezoning decision. The Court concluded that MHDC had met
the constitutional standing requirements by showing an injury
which was fairly traceable to the denial of rezoning and capable of
redress if injunctive relief were granted. 7 Despite the contingency
provisions in its contract, MHDC suffered economic injury, based
upon expenditures made on plans for the housing project and studies submitted in support of its rezoning petition, and noneconomic
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (Supp. IV 1974).
65. 373 F. Supp. at 211.
66. 517 F.2d at 409.
67. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the Court emphasized that "a plaintiff who
seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally would benefit in a
tangible way from the court's intervention." Id. at 508. However, the injury may be indirect,
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973), as long as it is an "injury that fairly can
be traced to the challenged action of the defendant." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976).
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injury,18 based upon the defeat of its objective to provide suitable
low cost housing." The denial of rezoning by the village "stands as
an absolute barrier to constructing the housing."7
There is no doubt that MHDC's economic and noneconomic
injury gave it standing to challenge an arbitrary or irrational zoning
action. The heart of the claim, however, was racial discrimination,
not arbitrary zoning by the village. The Court determined that it
was unnecessary to decide whether MHDC, a corporation with no
racial identity, had standing to assert the constitutional rights of its
prospective tenants. At least one of the respondents, a black working in the village and desirous of securing low cost housing there,
had standing.7 This prospective tenant alleged an "actionable causal relationship" between the village's zoning decision and his asserted injury.72
After concluding that standing was not a barrier to MHDC, the
Court addressed the burden of proof required to show an equal
protection violation. Although proof of a racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required, MHDC did not need to show that the
challenged action rested solely or even predominantly on racially
discriminatory purposes.7" Since racial discrimination is not just
another competing consideration to be balanced by legislators or
administrators, there is no need for judicial deference when there is
proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor.
Even pursuant to this standard, the Court held that MHDC failed
to carry its burden of proving that such an intent or purpose was a
motivating factor in the rezoning decision.
The decision reaffirmed the principle that official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. To determine whether an invidiously discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor, a careful inquiry must be
made into circumstantial and direct evidence of intent, such as
disproportionate impact, the historical background of the challenged decision, legislative or administrative history, specific antecedent events, contemporary statements of the decisionmakers and
68. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973).
69. The Court distinguished Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), by noting that
"[tlhis is not mere abstract concern about a problem of general interest." 429 U.S. at 263.
70. 429 U.S. at 261.
71. Id. at 264.
72. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 507 (1975).
73. 429 U.S. at 265.
74. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Supreme Court decided, after the
issuance of the circuit court opinion in Arlington Heights, that a showing of discriminatory
intent is a prerequisite to establishing a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
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departures from normal procedures. 5 Applying these criteria, the
Court concluded, as both courts below had found, that there was no
proof that the rezoning decision was racially motivated. The case
was reversed and remanded to the circuit court to decide whether
the rezoning decision violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968."1
On remand, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its earlier holding
that the village's refusal to rezone had a discriminatory effect." The
court concluded that the project would create a substantial number
of federally subsidized low cost housing units not presently available
in Arlington Heights. Since a greater percentage of black than white
people in the Chicago metropolitan area satisfied the income requirements for federally subsidized housing, the village's refusal to
rezone had a greater impact on blacks than on whites.
After determining that the village's action had a discriminatory
effect, the court focused on the basic question as to whether the
refusal to rezone violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968, even though
the action was taken without discriminatory intent. Section 3604(a)
of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 provides in part: "it shall be unlawful [t]o . . . make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 8 The key
language construed by the court was the phrase "because of race."
The court adopted the broad effect-oriented view instead of the
narrow intent-oriented view to determine whether there had been a
section 3604(a) violation. In the broad effect-oriented view "a party
commits an act 'because of race' whenever the natural and foreseeable consequence of that act is to discriminate between races, regard79
less of his intent."
To establish a violation of the Federal Housing Act of 1968
without a showing of discriminatory intent, the court identified four
factors which must be examined: (1) the strength of plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) the amount of evidence showing a
discriminatory intent; (3) the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) the plaintiffs requested relief."
75. "In some extraordinary instances the members might be called to the stand at trial
to testify concerning the purpose of the official action, although even then such testimony
frequently will be barred by privilege." 429 U.S. at 268.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
77. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977). The reversal by the Supreme Court did not require the Seventh Circuit to change
its conclusion that the rezoning decision had a racially discriminatory effect, but only that
such a conclusion is irrelevant for a violation of the equal protection clause.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
79. 558 F.2d at 1288.
80. Id. at 1290.
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To find the requisite discriminatory effect in the first prong of
the test, the court established that there may be a greater adverse
effect on one racial group than on another. Alternatively, a discriminatory effect may result solely from the perpetuation of segregation
in the community. The court determined that there was not a strong
showing of a discriminatory effect of the first kind, since sixty
percent of the persons in the Chicago metropolitan area eligible for
federal housing subsidies in 1970 were white. However, as to the
second kind of racially discriminatory effect, the court noted that
the district court left unresolved the question as to whether the
village's action had a discriminatory effect upon the community by
perpetuating segregation. The court found no evidence that the village's decision was racially motivated but concluded that this was
the least important of the four factors.8 1 Great deference was given
to the defendant's interest since the defendant was "a governmental
body acting within the ambit of legitimately derived authority.""
Finally, the court noted that MHDC's requested relief sought only
to enjoin the village from interfering with its effort to construct a
housing project and did not seek to compel the village to take affirmative action.
After reviewing these four factors, the court concluded that the
case should be decided primarily on the basis of whether the governmental action, in denying the rezoning, would result in a discriminatory effect on the community. If there were no other land within
the village "which is both properly zoned and suitable for federally
subsidized low-cost housing, the Village's refusal to rezone constituted a violation of section 3604(a). ' 3
The Seventh Circuit then remanded the case to the district
court with specific instructions that MHDC must carry the burden
of showing both that subsidization would be available and that its
project would be racially integrated. 8 The village, however, must
carry the burden of proving that there was other property within
Arlington Heights that was both properly zoned and suitable for low
cost housing under federal standards. 85 In the event that the
defendant-village failed to meet its burden on remand, the circuit
court directed the district court to hold that the village's denial of
81. Id. at 1292.
82. Id. at 1293.
83. Id. at 1294.
84. MHDC hoped to obtain subsidization under § 8 of the United States Housing Act of
1937, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f (West Supp. 1978).
85. In his concurring opinion, Justice Fairchild urged that the burden of showing the
existence of other property suitable for low cost housing be allocated to MHDC. 558 F.2d at
1296.
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rezoning effectively precluded MHDC from constructing low cost
housing within the village and to grant MHDC the requested relief."
II.

DEVELOPMENTS OF REGIONAL IMPACT

In Sarasota County v. Department of Administration7 a petition for writ of certiorari filed by the county was denied by the
District Court of Appeal, Second District, for lack of standing. Sarasota County had originally petitioned the Department of Administration for a declaratory statement" that a proposed crude oil splitter refining facility in Manatee County be declared a development
of regional impact (DRI).8 The Department of Administration issued a declaratory statement ruling that DRIs are limited to those
projects identified by specific guidelines and standards in section
22F-2 of the Florida Administrative Code (1976). Oil splitters were
not included within the DRI rule's guidelines and standards.
Since "[a]gency disposition of petitions [for declaratory statements] shall be final agency action,"' , and "[a] party who is adversely affected by final agency action is entitled to judicial review,"'" it would appear that Sarasota County's lack of standing
would have to be based upon a holding that the county was not
adversely affected by the declaratory statement. While noting these
specific provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act," the Second District framed the issue as whether the county had standing
to invoke the procedures of the Florida Environmental Land and
Water Management Act of 1972.13 In focusing the issue as such, it
would seem that the Second District was implying that only those
entities authorized to initiate the DRI process could be adversely
affected by the declaratory statement.
Initially, the Second District determined that the issuance of
an unfavorable declaratory statement did not itself confer standing
for judicial review upon the recipient, especially when a court was
hearing the standing issue for the first time." After recognizing that
oil splitters were not identified within existing DRI guidelines and
86. Id. at 1295.
87. 350 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
88. FLA. STAT. § 120.565 (1977).
89. Id. § 380.06(1) defines a development of regional impact as: "[Any development
which, because of its character, magnitude, or location, would have a substantial effect upon
health, safety or welfare of citizens of more than one county."

90. Id. § 120.565.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.§ 120.68.
350 So. 2d at 805. See also FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50 -.73 (1977).
FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.10 (1977).
350 So. 2d at 805.
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standards, the court attempted to determine appropriate entities
involved in the DRI process which would have standing if a proposed development did not fall within the guidelines and standards.
The court noted that regional planning agencies, pursuant to section
380.06(3) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), may recommend to
the state land planning agency, types of development to be designated as DRIs. In addition, section 380.06(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976) affords a developer an opportunity to receive a
binding determination from the state land planning agency as to
whether his proposed development would be a development of regional impact. Based on these provisions, the Second District determined that only the regional planning agency, an appropriate local
government, or the state planning agency may initiate the DRI
process with respect to developments that are not included within
the DRI guidelines and standards." Consequently, the court concluded that the "[clounty's position that the DRI process applies
to the Project is, in essence, an attempt to force the Department to
make an ad hoc determination of the status of the Project where it
has no authority to initiate such a process."" Consistent with prior
appellate holdings, the Second District found that Sarasota County
was not one of the entities authorized to initiate the DRI process
under section 380.06. 9
A concurring opinion presented two viable alternatives to the
county that would not abrogate section 380.06. First, it was suggested that the county recommend to a regional planning agency
additional types of development to be identified as DRIs." In addition, the county could initiate proceedings under section 403.412 of
the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), which would require Manatee
County to comply with the DRI process. 9
In dissent, Judge Scheb argued that the issuance of a declaratory statement is final agency action reviewable pursuant to section
120.68 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976). On the merits, he contended that the declaratory statement issued by the Department of
Administration holding that the oil splitter is not a DRI was incorrect as a matter of law.'" Judge Scheb took exception to the department's conclusion that the projects itemized in section 22F-2 of the
95. Id. at 806.

96. Id.
97. See Pinellas County v. Lake Padgett Pines, 333 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976);
Sarasota County v. General Dev. Corp., 325 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); Sarasota County
v. Beker Phosphate Corp., 322 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
98. 350 So. 2d at 807.

99. Id.
100. Id.
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Florida Administrative Code (Supp. 1976) "are all-inclusive with no
discretion left in the state and planning agency to consider whether
an unlisted project is or is not a DRI. ' ' °
Judge Scheb concluded that the Department of Administration
may, and should, consider whether developments not listed in existing DRI guidelines and standards comply with the statutory definition of development of regional impact provided in section 380.06(1)
of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976). Failure to consider the application of the statute to new types of DRIs unduly restricts legislative
intent.
III.

INVERSE CONDEMNATION

JupiterInlet Corp. v. Village of Tequesta °2 presented the question of whether a plaintiff has a cause of action against a municipality which destroyed the plaintiff's water source while pursuing a
public purpose. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, answered in the affirmative.
Jupiter Inlet Corporation owned condominiums which drew
their potable water from a shallow aquifer located directly beneath
the corporation's land. The aquifer extended beyond the limits of
the plaintiff's land so that defendant Tequesta was able to place
pumps into that aquifer as well. The alleged injury to the corporation resulted from such a high volume of water removal by Tequesta
for public use that the aquifer became depleted and allowed a salt
water intrusion to occur. In order to continue supplying its condominiums with fresh water, the corporation was forced to pump water
from a deeper aquifer at considerably greater expense.
When a governmental entity takes private property for a public
purpose without formally exercising its eminent domain power, the
aggrieved owner has a cause of action for inverse condemnation to
obtain just compensation for the property taken. 3 The rule is easily
stated, but its application through multiple theoretical bases has
led to a judicial juggling of rationale so that in a particular fact
situation the result may turn upon the rationale applied. In the
court's words: "[M]uch hinges on how the word 'take' is interpreted. Florida courts have not, over the years, been in consistent
agreement on this matter, particularly where-as in this
case-there was no actual entry by the governmental authority on
the owner's land.' 0 4
101. Id. at 808.
102. 349 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
103. City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964), cert. denied,
172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 981 (1968). FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
104. 349 So. 2d at 217.
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Even though there had been no actual entry by the Village of
Tequesta, the court concluded that a taking had occurred. "It seems
apparent . . .that when something is removed from its owner's
property by a governmental agency and put to a public use, it has
been taken."'' 5 It is irrelevant to the fact of "taking" whether it was
accomplished by a physical entry onto the property or by pumping.
use
"In either event, the owner has been deprived of the beneficial
06
of his property by government action for a public purpose.'
Essential to the holding was the recognition that the aquifer
does constitute private property.' 7 Though not recognized by the
court, the determination of whether a taking has occurred often
hinges on the meaning given to the word "property."''0
The opinion is noteworthy for its explicit recognition of the
difficulty encountered by Florida courts in resolving "taking" matters. For example, resolution of the case turned on whether a taking
could occur absent physical intrusion onto the land. Yet as early as
1887, the Supreme Court of the United States explained that a
taking occurs when "property is taken away from an innocent
owner."'0 9 Since then, it has become well settled that a taking may
occur through land use regulations which do not entail a physical
invasion of private property."10 Nonetheless, the court was unable to
rely upon a cohesive doctrine to resolve the issue. The lack of a
unified approach, of course, causes legal and policy uncertainty.
The court's opinion is not likely to provide a rationale for resolving
future inverse condemnation cases, but rather demonstrates the
need for legislative definition of the term "taking.""'
IV.

LAKE OWNERSHIP

Odom v. Deltona Corp."2 raised the issue of whether certain
nonmeandered lakes were the private property of a corporation or
sovereign lands held in trust by the state for the public. Deltona,
which held paper title to the lakes, had attempted to alter the
shores, bottoms and waters of the lakes to develop the lands for
community purposes. State officers and agents interfered with those
105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
109. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Forde v. City of
Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941).
111. See generally Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The
Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REv. 727 (1967).
112. 341 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1977).
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activities. The corporation then sought declaratory and injunctive
relief.
In response to the state's assertion that the land areas in question lay beneath navigable sovereign waters granted Florida upon
becoming a state in 1845, the Supreme Court of Florida declared
that the federal title test is the proper test for determining whether
a particular lake was navigable in 1845, so as to vest sovereign title
in the state."3 Under this test, navigability is based on whether the
water body has potential for commercial use in its ordinary and
natural condition without any artificial improvements."' The court
recognized that meandering"' is evidence of navigability and creates
a rebuttable presumption of navigability;"' conversely, nonmeandered lakes and ponds are rebuttably presumed nonnavigable.17
Moreover, a water body should be regarded as being nonnavigable
absent evidence of navigability."' Based on these propositions, the
court implicitly confirmed the lower court's determination that the
lakes were nonnavigable and privately owned. A divided supreme
court concluded by holding that even if navigable waters were involved, the state's claim to beds underlying the waters previously
conveyed to Deltona was extinguished by the Marketable Record
Title Act."'
The court addressed the argument that a grantee of swamp and
overflowed lands under a trustee deed' 0 takes with "notice" that the
conveyance did not include sovereign land. Conceding that the
"notice of navigability" concept is applicable in the case of a large
lake such as Lake Okeechobee, the court refused to apply the concept to small nonmeandered lakes.' 2 '
The court emphasized that the state, like its citizens, should be
estopped from denying the effect of the Marketable Record Title Act
if it has failed specifically to reserve public rights in the conveyed
113. Id. at 988.
114. Id. The Florida test for navigability is almost the same as the federal title test. Id.
115. "To meander a lake means to survey along its shores, as opposed to running the
survey lines directly across the body of water itself." F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER, & F. BALDwIN,
WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 400 n.337 (1968).
116. Cf. Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909).
117. 341 So. 2d at 989.
118. Id.
119. FLA. STAT. §§ 712.01-.10 (1977). The court confirmed the trial court's finding that
Deltona and its predecessors held title for more than 30 years and that the state neither
reserved any interest in, nor made any effort to reclaim, the conveyed property. 341 So. 2d
at 989-90.
120. "Trustee deed" refers to a deed issued by the Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund, an agency of the State of Florida and one of the defendants in Odom.
121. 341 So. 2d at 988.
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land. Neither new standards of value relating to ecological and recreational needs nor a change of personnel can justify upsetting the
stability of title.'22 In addition to the state's failure to reserve rights
in the land, estoppel should be applied because "public officials
operating under color of law acquiesced in the development of the
land surrounding the lakes indicating a willingness for residential
development contiguous to the waters, including necessary modification of lake bottoms."' 1 Neither the supreme court nor the trial
court cited particular activities engaged in by state officials "under
the color of law" which formed the basis for applying equitable
estoppel. It may be presumed, therefore, that the state's failure to
assert its title claim for an extended period of time, coupled with
its apparent notice of Deltona's claim to title and intended development activity were sufficient to trigger a finding of equitable estop2

pel. 1

The court specified that only the status of sovereign title was
addressed in Odom. Accordingly, this case is not dispositive of
claims regarding pollution or damage to other property when the
claims are not dependent upon ownership. 25 Hence, the question of
applicability of constitutionally permissible police power regulations to Deltona's lakes and related development was explicitly re2
served by both the trial court and the supreme court. 1
Justice Sundberg, with the concurrence of Chief Justice Overton and Justice England, submitted a vigorous dissent to the majority's application of the Marketable Record Title Act "to divest the
people of the State of Florida of lands held in public trust for
them.'

21

The dissent was bottomed on the proposition that "it

should be presumed that all conveyances of submerged land areas
by the Trustees are made with implicit reservation to the state of
'2
navigable water.' 1

122. Id. at 989.
123. Id.
124. Rhodes, Haigler & Brown, Land Use Controls, 1976 Developments in FloridaLaw,
31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1083, 1098 (1977).
125. Of general interest is the supreme court's restatement of governmental authority to
regulate in the public interest "development of all public and private water areas" prefacing
the body of its opinion. 341 So. 2d at 987.
126. The court reaffirmed its prior judgment that FLA. STAT. § 253.151 (1975), providing
standards for determining the boundary line of navigable meandered fresh water lakes, was
unconstitutional, State v. Florida Nat'l Properties, Inc., 338 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976), but it
stressed that the trial court's reliance on this section did not affect the result. 341 So. 2d at
989. The court also invalidated the criminal provisions of §§ 253.124 and 370.035 based on a
finding that the term "navigable" was so vague that it was not reasonably possible to determine if a permit was required for activity in and around a nonmeandered lake. Failure to
secure a permit for such activity was subject to criminal penalties. Id. at 987, 990.
127. 341 So. 2d at 990.
128. Id.

